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Is the international order since 1989 a continuation
of the order crafted by the USA after the Second
World War? Or did the many efforts in the early
1990s to seize on the ‘peace dividend’ to create an
order based on cooperative over collective security,
human security over state security, and new
multilateralism led by an unleashed UN, transform
global security ‘toward a new world order’, as even
US President George H.W. Bush proposed in an
address to a joint session of the US Congress on
11 September 1990?1
In After Victory, John Ikenberry argues that any
international order is shaped by victory in major
war and what the victorious states do with their
‘newly acquired power’. If they seek to keep that
power by, ‘paradoxically’ finding ways ‘to set
limits on their power and make it acceptable to
other states’ and bind themselves ‘to long-term
commitments’ (Ikenberry 2001: xi), that order
will be stable. For Ikenberry, the victors in 1989,
the USA and its Western allies, did initially follow
this principle. More than a decade after, the
result was a ‘remarkable durability of the 1945
order among the industrial democracies despite
the end of the Cold War’ (Ikenberry 2001: 257).
The unilateralism of the George W. Bush
Administration in the next decade, 2001–8,
including its repeated refusal to be bound by
long-term commitments, including treaties
signed,2 would suggest instead a major break.
Analysts and citizens in many parts of the world,
such as the Middle East and Latin America,
began to argue openly that the USA had become
the greatest threat to global security, not its
hegemonic stabiliser. That the US
Administration had company in many of those
actions, whether in Iraq and Afghanistan or its
policy on Israel and Palestine, from some or all of
its post-1945 NATO allies, in contrast, would
seem to support the Ikenberry assessment.
This apparent contradiction between US
unilateralism in 2001–8 and the support for US
policies, however grudgingly, by its allies of 1945
and 1989 is viewed by other scholars, such as
Mark Duffield and Rita Abrahamsen, as
demonstrating a new global order. No longer
based on a single hegemon but on an organised
system of hegemony, this post-1989 order is far
more reminiscent of nineteenth-century
colonialism in which the wealthy states of the
North, according to Duffield, now use
humanitarian and development assistance in
addition to military power to ensure their own
security (‘the Western way of life’, Duffield 2007:
2) against threats from the South.
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This article takes the position that it is too soon
to say what the post-1989 global security order is,
despite nearly two decades of global
restructuring. As Ikenberry predicted, the first
phase of redefinition was a contest among the
victors, the USA and its post-1945 allies, over how
to institutionalise their newly acquired power.
Francis Fukuyama proved wrong from the very
start that 1989 was an ‘end to history’ (Fukuyama
1989). This contest took place in Europe, but it
was soon superseded by a new polarity. North and
South replaced East and West, and Northern
policies toward the South do appear to be
defensively motivated in a transformative agenda,
whether as ‘counterinsurgency’ (Duffield 2001),
‘disciplining’ (Abrahamsen 2000), or value
change (Jervis 2002).
At the same time, the particular policies chosen
by the Bush Administration at the critical
juncture of 1989–90 both provoked challenges to
Northern hegemony and resulted in greater
heterogeneity in the South. The tensions
between the Northern agenda and Southern
states, on the one hand, and the new
opportunities for alternative political coalitions
within the South and between some Southern
states and the North, on the other, make this a
very fluid environment. Whether some new
multipolarity of unknown stabilising mechanisms
results or, as Ikenberry would argue, the postwar
victors find a way to make their new order
acceptable to the rest, is difficult to predict.
This article will propose instead to identify three
trends in the evolution of a new security order
and some of the tensions and differentiation they
have provoked, beginning with the policies of US
President George H.W. Bush, in the flush of
Western triumphalism of 1989 and the goal of
maintaining the post-1945 order under the new
conditions. I label these ‘allies from within’, the
‘new regionalism’ and ‘rogue states and failed
states’.
1 Allies from within
The victory of 1989 was economic and political,
not military. The end of the Soviet Union and
communist power in Eastern Europe was a
victory for capitalism as a world system.
Fukuyama’s claim was that it was also a victory
for ‘liberal democracy as the final form of human
governance’. Yet to extend the principles of the
order that the USA created in Western Europe
after 1945 to the rest of the globe required
radical transformation of the domestic orders of
all those countries that had been socialist or
retained the capacity for alternative policies. The
goal, as the president of the World Bank at the
time, Barber Conable, said in a speech to open
the Bank’s annual conference on development
economics in September 1991, ‘[i]f we are to
achieve development, we must aim for growth
that cannot be easily reversed through the
political process of imperfect governance’ (cited
in Doornbos 2003: 8). The faster the pace of
change, the less opportunity for political
resistance, as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank and USAID staff explicitly
argued at the time in the cases of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union to explain
‘shock therapy’ and rapid privatisation of state-
owned assets before the apparently necessary
institutions could be created.
These policies had an explicit security
dimension. As Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin
argue in regard to the original model, the USA
after 1945 did not create an empire in the
nineteenth century sense, particularly as
portrayed by theorists of imperialism, but would
instead create ‘allies from within’ (Panitch and
Gindin 2004). The Marshall Plan would use US
aid and political conditionality to influence
changes in the domestic institutions and policies
of European countries in such a way that the
countries’ own interests would become naturally
aligned with US economic interests. NATO
would then gather these economic allies into a
‘transatlantic community’ of collective security,
defined as much by the values it protected as the
states’ territory.
The first phase of this policy occurred in Eastern
Europe, and it had an advantage in that post-
1945 order. The USA could get the European
Union (EU) and NATO to perform this task of
transformation – elsewhere it would have to rely
on the IMF, World Bank and World Trade
Organization (WTO). Yet even in this first
phase, the allies’ common economic and security
interests were not enough to override their
competing national interests. US businesses met
stiff competition from European businesses,
particularly German investors, in Eastern
Europe, Russia and the post-Soviet republics.
Most EU member states aside from the UK
(based on national interest toward the EU, not
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its ‘special relationship’ with the USA) resisted
enlargement for almost a decade, and they still
resist US pressure in regard to the western
Balkans and Turkey. European efforts to change
European security architecture in order to act
early towards Yugoslavia in 1990–1, by contrast,
was resisted by President Bush, who opposed the
extension of Article V guarantees beyond
NATO’s 1990 borders and, along with the USSR,
any action by the Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as
well. EU reluctance on enlargement and US
insistence on retaining dominance over
European security began to break down in 1994
under President William J. Clinton under
pressure from Poland to use NATO membership
as leverage to EU membership. By the end of the
decade, however, these disputes appeared to have
been led by friction among allies with common
systemic interests: Poland was a member of the
EU, and NATO was acting globally to implement
US policy in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Indian
Ocean and beyond.
Although there were no comparable regional
allies to carry out domestic transformation in the
rest of the world, this disadvantage was eased by
a new advantage. With economic and political
reform and then the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the source of financial or military support for
alternative economic policies and security
alliances in the global South was gone. The
structural constraints of global capital were
already seeing the domestic effects by the early
1990s, such as in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South
Africa, India and Brazil, with financial assistance
and conditions from international financial
institutions (IFIs) and Western donors. The
power of IFIs and Western donors over policies in
the South was extended from the orthodox
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural
adjustment policies of the 1980s and the goal of
imposing agencies of restraint on domestic
economic policies to political reform under the
label of ‘good governance’ and democratic
participation. This neoliberal consolidation has
had potentially profound effects on the global
South: while some now had the trade power and
economic interest to join with Northern states,
as in the G20, or to bargain collectively in the
South, as in the Doha Trade Round, or as foreign
investors like IBSA,3 many others were consumed
by civil war or what the North terms as ‘state
failure’.
2 The new regionalism
The second US policy, proposed by George H.W.
Bush in Ankara in July 1991, was the security
component of postwar policy toward the non-
European, non-NATO part of the world: a new
regionalism. Global security would now be based
on a ‘hub and spokes’ of regional organisations and
powers that were US allies and would accept ever
larger financial and organisational responsibility
for implementing a still US-led global order.
Bush’s hopeful reference in ‘Toward a New World
Order’ to a UN that would be freed from Cold War
politics (the threat of Soviet veto and resistance to
US policies from non-aligned powers) to play the
role in international peace and security envisioned
at San Francisco, can be seen as prelude to this
policy. The Security Council did, indeed, approve a
cascade of UN activism in peacemaking and
peacebuilding, beginning in 1989–90, while the
USA refused to provide its own soldiers or pay its
dues until 1999. The costs of peacekeeping
operations and military capacities would be
outsourced to regional organisations. The US
remains the obstacle to any change in financing for
peacekeeping operations away from unpredictable
voluntary contributions to a more reliable
budgetary base in member-state assessments.
Growing US frustration with opposition from the
non-aligned caucus at the UN during the 1990s
and then, along with its European allies, the
refusal of non-European powers – Russia, China
and India especially – to sanction military
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, however, revived
tensions between the USA and the UN and
inspired hopeful prospects for UN reform and
financing. The concept of the new regionalism
appears to have won instead. The EU has
developed rapid reaction and crisis management
capacities, the USA and some allies have been
actively strengthening the security capabilities of
the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS is to
assume ever more of the burden of peace
operations in Africa, and even those most
committed to the principle of non-intervention
have now lowered the bar significantly to
Security Council approval only. Russian troops
participated in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo; China is the one of the largest
contributors to UN peacekeeping missions
globally and the largest of the Permanent Five;
and military forces from Brazil, Argentina and
Chile even led the UN stabilisation mission in
Haiti for the USA.
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The new regionalism has its economic
complement in the growing emphasis on regional
trade pacts, and places where regional powers are
strong, such as South Africa and the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) or
the Brazilian-initiated Union de Naciones del Sur
(UNASUR) have increasingly linked development
and security for regional conflict management as
well as defence cooperation. Even India signed a
new defence pact with the USA in 2008 that
included regional responsibilities.
3 Rogue states and failed states
While the USA moved to extend its post-1945
economic and security order to the rest of the
world after 1989, it was not so clear what the
USA would now do militarily as the ‘sole
remaining superpower’ with a defence
establishment organised entirely around a
vanished Soviet threat. Arms control circles in
the USA and Western Europe seized early on the
opportunity to argue for a shift from collective
security of blocs to cooperative security based on
the CSCE. By 1994, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) was urging an
even more radical shift in security by dedicating
its annual Human Development Report to a new
concept – human security – to replace military
budgets for the defence of states and territory,
with its extraordinary waste on stockpiles of
armaments and standing armies, with aid to
economic and social development focused on
individuals and their rights to social and
economic security.4
Within the US government, in contrast, as
Michael Klare has revealed, the former
chairman of President Bush’s Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Colin Powell, realised already with
the events in Hungary in August 1989 and before
that he had ‘to construct a new threat scenario to
justify the preservation of America’s superpower
capabilities in a world devoid of a prime
adversary’ (Klare 1998: 12). First presented to
President Bush on 15 November 1989, Powell’s
new, post-Soviet strategy argued for a shift to
‘rising Third World powers’, and in President
Bush’s formal announcement the next year, on
2 August 1990, that ‘America must possess forces
able to respond to threats in whatever corner of
the globe they may occur’. Powell labelled these
rising powers ‘rogue states’. The threat of ‘rogue
leaders’ was further refined under the Clinton
Administration as ‘leaders set on regional
domination through military aggression’
(Secretary of Defence Les Aspin) and as those
who ‘not only choose to remain outside the
family of nations but also assault its basic values’
(National Security Advisor Anthony Lake) and
cause nuclear proliferation (Klare 1998: 12–14).
Amidst these debates about the redefinition of
security and the use of military force, the actual
pressures for military intervention in the 1990s
came from civil wars and humanitarian
emergencies, rather than Washington’s focus on
rogue states or alternatives promoting human
security. The humanitarian community thus
called for the redeployment of US and allied
military assets to intervene more effectively and
often in humanitarian emergencies; intentions
were to establish an international obligation to
intervene (a devoir d’ingérence according to its
proponent, Bernard Kouchner) and build on the
growing public awareness of and horror at the
human cost of the wars in Somalia and Bosnia,
among others. UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, Sadako Ogata, added to this a ‘right to
stay’ in their home country for the internally
displaced and potential refugees in place of
seeking asylum in a third country, but which
would require international intervention to
protect civilians during wartime. The human
rights community succeeded, against US
opposition, in winning a ban on antipersonnel
land mines on the grounds of human security, as
well as new instruments to enforce the laws of
war, such as the International Criminal Court.
Even development agencies, from USAID to the
World Bank, introduced the link between
security and development and the ‘real global
threat’ of failed states, including consequences,
such as civil conflicts and destabilising refugee
flows (Atwood 1994).
Although two security threats competing for use
of military power, ‘rogue states’ and ‘failed
states’, differed substantially in their
assumptions about intervention and their
advocates, they both represent a North–South
polarity. The debates were among Northern
states and actors whereas the objects of
intervention, whether for development or
security, were in the South. Although states in
the global South introduced the concept of ‘non-
traditional security’ and attempted to insert
their concerns into the global agenda, such as
energy security, cultural security, environmental
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security, and so forth, the debate remained
focused in the North. In relation to the multiple
challenges emerging within this debate and
resulting policies to US security doctrine, the
evolution of Norway and Canada away from the
developmental basis of human security is
particularly revealing.
In May 1998, the two countries joined forces in
Lysøen, Norway, to convene a group of like-
minded middle powers, including Japan,5 and
promote the concept of human security the
UNDP had initiated so as to redefine security
away from states and toward individuals and
explicitly as an alternative to the US’s state-
security and military focus. Two years later in
2000, however, the Canadian government broke
from this developmental focus by convening an
International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty in the aftermath of its role to
make possible the NATO bombing of Serbia in
1999, despite Security Council refusal to
authorise it (see Heinbecker 2004). A doctrine of
‘humanitarian intervention’ articulated for the
intervention in support of Kosovo Albanians was
then generalised by the Commission report of
September 2001 to be an international right and
obligation to intervene, if necessary, to protect
civilians at risk of massive human rights
violations when their own governments would
not or could not fulfill their ‘sovereign
responsibility to protect’ their citizens.
This new doctrine of international security, the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), was presented by
the UN Secretary-General to the General
Assembly for adoption, in what would appear an
effort to return an eroding authority over
collective security to the UN. Its use of the
concept of state failure is distinct from that
claimed by the US national security strategy of
2002 in response to the attacks on New York and
Washington in September 2001 and the doctrinal
basis for the US-led ‘global war on terror’
(GWOT) beginning in Afghanistan in 2001 and,
less successfully at the UN, in 2003 against Iraq.
At the same time, however, the contrast with
another commission on human security funded by
Japan and presented to the UN, which retains the
developmental concept of 1994,6 reveals a shift in
practice by US allies in Europe towards a concept
of security that has more in common with that of
the ‘rogue state’. Although all three former allies
(Canada, Japan and Norway) on human security
became prominent actors in support of the US
intervention in Afghanistan, the Canadian
initiative prevailed in the next step at the UN,
when the 2004 report of the High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by
Kofi Annan, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility (UN 2004), defined collective
security in terms of six clusters of threats (one of
which is ‘internal conflict, including civil war,
genocide and other large-scale atrocities’) that
oblige action on the principle that ‘Any event or
process that leads to large-scale death or
lessening of life chances and undermines States
as the basic unit of the international system is a
threat to international security’.7
4 Consequences
Although there remain disagreements within the
camp of victorious powers since 1989 about the
definition of security, the best use of military
power for collective security, and the goal of
development aid, I suggest that the trend
indicates a noticeable reduction in disagreements
in favour of choices made by the USA in 1989–90
to institutionalise its victory in the Cold War and
thereby define the succeeding international
order. NATO is now a global player and
expanding continuously. The concepts of
cooperative security and human security and the
organisations promoting these alternatives have
clearly lost while non-traditional security
concerns are struggling for attention. Funds
established to facilitate greater policy coherence
on security and development, such as the UK
Global Fund for Conflict Prevention or
Norwegian and Dutch aid for fragile states, are
currently being spent overwhelmingly on two
cases, Iraq and Afghanistan, and these cases, in
turn, are also having a major securitising
influence on UN peacekeeping missions and
humanitarian operations. Among emerging
economic powers in the global South, such as
China, India,8 and Brazil, there is a noticeable
willingness to accept US-defined obligations in
global security – being ‘responsible stakeholders’
in the words of Robert Zoellik when he was US
Deputy Secretary of State – based on their own
perceived self-interest in the US-led international
economic order. This includes assuming regional
leadership in managing security threats, whether
as states such as Brazil and China or
organisations such as the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the AU.
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Against this trend is the growing differentiation
in economic and political interests in the South,
which does not support a North–South polarity
and requires collaboration between Northern
states and those Southern states that have
economic and political resources to assist in
managing global security, on the one hand, and
similar security interests as the North against
the threat of failed states, spillover from civil
wars, nuclear proliferation, and alternative
economic agendas, on the other. The same
differentiation creates elements of opposition to
a US-led Northern agenda, such as the domestic
turmoil, declining state capacity, and rising
inequality and poverty that many attribute
persuasively to the transformative, neoliberal
agenda of the USA, IMF, World Bank, and many
development donors. Although new regional
approaches to these facts either challenge US
policy, as that of ASEAN toward Myanmar, or are
autonomous of the USA, as those emerging in
South America in regard to Bolivia and
Venezuela or in Africa to Zimbabwe, for current
examples, the lack of US support militarily and
financially for UN peacekeeping operations
appears still to be sufficient to override reforms
provoked by the High-Level Panel report. UN
peacekeeping missions were severely under-
resourced by 2008, particularly in Africa,
prompting the outgoing department head to
accuse the Security Council of squandering this
valuable instrument.9 Another instance of
opposition to US dominance, but whose
implications are more difficult to assess, is the
growing anti-USA sentiment, particularly in
Islamic countries and populations in reaction to
the US war in Iraq and its ‘GWOT’ military
activities, such as bombings in Afghanistan and
Pakistan that incur heavy civilian casualties and
violate sovereignty norms.
Whether justified in terms of ‘rogue states’,
‘failed states’, or R2P, governments in the South
in general are also reacting increasingly to these
multiplying Northern excuses, in their view, to
intervene and remove all barriers to interference
in the domestic affairs of a state at will and to
instrumentalise the UN for this agenda. The
consequence since 2001 has been a defensive,
sovereignty-or-bust revival of the principle of
non-intervention, even from many states in the
South that had been moving toward support for
this agenda, whether because they agreed with
the values to be protected, had national
economic interests more in line with the global
North than their neighbours, or had separate
national interests in taking on the role of new
‘regional powers’. While opposition from
governments in Myanmar, Iran, North Korea,
and Sri Lanka are currently seen as outliers, the
more common expression of this reaction is a
rhetorical assertion of the principle of and need
for more ‘ownership’. In the context of a
simultaneous Northern pressure for democracy,
however compromised by shifts in US policy
between 2001 and 2008, the USA and its allies
are less able to dismiss the electoral effects of
popular anger generated by their policies, such
as the reaction of the new Pakistani government
to US military incursions into Pakistani villages
in 2008 or the electoral power of Hamas in
Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the
indigenous population in Bolivia.
These opposite trends and multiple opportunities
to form new political coalitions around new
agendas in global security raise the question
about where and how alternative leadership
might emerge. Two sources of tension are
suggestive. On security issues directly is the
failure of Western policies of incorporation
toward Russia as measured by Russian reaction in
2007–8 against the systematic and repeated
dismissal of its views and concerns since 1991.
Based on the initial ‘allies from within’ projection
of power by the post-1945 allies – Russia was
incorporated economically when the G-7 agreed
to become the G-8 and more gingerly in security
policy with the creation of the NATO–Russia
Council – this policy presumed interests and
policy perspectives would follow. Instead, conflicts
between Russia and the USA and most European
allies began early over the break-up of Yugoslavia
in 1991–2. The result was an open clash in 1999
over NATO military intervention in Serbia, which
infected economic relations when the USA and
the EU claimed that Russian moves to charge
global market rates for oil and gas, thus removing
Soviet-era subsidies, were a security threat, and
pushed Russia into confrontation over the blatant
disregard for international law and the role of the
UN Security Council, in Russian eyes, in their
unilateral recognition of the independence of
Kosovo and its destabilising precedent globally
(beginning with South Ossetia and Abkhazia).
When the latter exploded into violence in the
summer of 2008, the western alliance rallied
around the US position and NATO remarkably
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fast, despite an initial EU effort to find a more
nuanced position that respected both the
Georgian (and thus US) and Russian positions.
Russia appeared to lose as well in its opposition to
eventual NATO membership for Georgia and the
Ukraine and with potential Asian allies in
Vladimir Putin’s effort to formulate a conceptual
basis for an alternative global alliance against US
militarism and policies on the basis of the Kosovo
case. But the Kosovo case, followed by
Afghanistan and Iraq, make clear that the issues
of sovereignty and of leadership in global security
are not resolved as the victorious powers
presumed in 1989–90.
Second, regarding the economic aspects of global
security, in particular the room for alternatives
on domestic policy and security alliances, the
role of Chinese aid as an alternative to IFI and
OECD donor aid in Africa, South-east Asia, and
Latin America is already significant, particularly
in light of the global financial crisis of 2008. It is
this factor especially that demonstrates the
fluidity of the current global security order and
the substantial bases for alternative political
coalitions and outcomes in the future than that
which seemed inevitable in 1989–90.
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* I wish to thank the Ford Foundation for its
generous grant to my project on State Failure:
Reframing the International Economic and Political
Agenda, which made possible the research for
this article.
1 The speech concerned the Persian Gulf crisis,
in retrospect an iconic moment for eventual
change in the global security order.
2 See Chayes (2008) on the consequences.
3 India, Brazil, South Africa.
4 For a comprehensive history and analysis of
the concept of human security, see
MacFarlane and Khong (2006).
5 This group soon included Austria, Chile,
Ireland, Greece, Jordan, Mali, the
Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa,
Switzerland and Thailand, under a Canadian
label, the Human Security Network (see
Suhrke 1999).
6 MacFarlane and Khong (2006: 235) identify
this parting of the ways in terms of perceived
security threats, between a Canadian focus on
‘freedom from fear and violence’ and a
Japanese focus on ‘freedom from want’. For
more on the Commission on Human Security,
see pp. 157–63.
7 A More Secure World, p. 2; the report was
adopted by the UN General Assembly in its
World Summit Outcome Document on 25 October
2005; see, in particular, paragraphs 138 and
139.
8 The case of India is particularly instructive,
not only because of its decision after almost 60
years of protecting its security independence
to sign a bilateral security pact with the USA,
but also because the decision by the
Communist Party to leave the coalition with
the Congress Party in protest made it possible
for the government to adopt another round of
neoliberal economic reforms in 2008. For a
critical Indian analysis of the security treaty,
see Chenoy and Chenoy (2007).
9 Harvey Morris, ‘Conflict Interventions Push
Close to “the Outer Limit of Peacekeeping”’,
Financial Times, 24 July 2008, p. 5.
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